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 This appeal stems from appellants' action to compel 
Beaverbrook Coal Company, George Huss, Jr., William Huss and Huss 
Industries, Inc. to make interim withdrawal liability payments 
while the parties arbitrate liability.  The district court denied 
appellants' motion for injunctive relief and their motion for 
reconsideration.  We will reverse and remand. 
 I. 
 Appellants are trustees of the Anthracite Health and Welfare 
Fund and the fund itself (collectively, the "Fund"), a 
multiemployer pension plan under the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq.  The 
Beaverbrook Coal Company, a signatory to the Anthracite Wage 
Agreement, is a general partnership consisting of George Huss, 
Jr. and William Huss.  Huss Industries, Inc. is a Pennsylvania 
corporation.  Beaverbrook, George and William Huss, and Huss 
Industries are all appellees. 
 For over ten years, Beaverbrook made payments to the 
Anthracite Health and Welfare Fund Pension Plan.  In August of 
1994, the Fund notified Beaverbrook that it had effectively 
withdrawn from the Fund on June 15, 1993.  The Fund subsequently 
assessed Beaverbrook withdrawal liability in the amount of 
$146,242.00, to be paid in monthly installments of $1,966.17.  
Beaverbrook initiated arbitration proceedings to contest the 
Fund's claim.  Because Beaverbrook refused to make withdrawal 
liability payments in the interim, the Fund sued under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(g)(2) to recover the delinquent payments, liquidated 
  
 
 3 
damages, attorney's fees and costs.  The Fund also sought an 
order directing appellees to make monthly payments and to provide 
a bond in the total amount of the withdrawal liability.  One 
month later the Fund requested the same relief by a motion for a 
mandatory preliminary injunction.   
 The district court denied both the Fund's motion for a 
preliminary injunction and its motion for reconsideration.  
Noting the employer's "compelling obligation to make interim 
payments" under MPPAA, the court nonetheless held that the Fund 
had failed to demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm 
if temporary relief were not granted.  The district court further 
indicated that Beaverbrook might not be obligated to make interim 
payments when the merits of the Fund's claim were considered if 
Beaverbrook showed that it would suffer irreparable harm as a 
result.  Finally, the court declined to rule on whether all of 
the defendants were employers for purposes of MPPAA and, 
consequently, obligated to satisfy Beaverbrook's withdrawal 
liability, holding that Flying Tiger Line v. Teamsters Pension 
Trust Fund of Philadelphia, 830 F.2d 1241 (3d Cir. 1987) mandated 
that the issue be addressed first in arbitration. 
 On appeal, the Fund argues that it need not satisfy the 
traditional requirements for a preliminary injunction because, 
under MPPAA, employers are required to make interim payments, so 
the Fund need show only that payments were not made when 
demanded.  The Fund also disputes the district court's suggestion 
that Beaverbrook may avoid making interim payments if it can 
demonstrate that it would be irreparably harmed as a result.  In 
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addition, the Fund contends that under Flying Tiger the court 
must decide whether all of the appellees are considered employers 
for purposes of MPPAA, since the answer to that question 
determines the arbitrator's jurisdiction.  The issues appellant 
raises are legal questions over which we exercise plenary review; 
we will consider each in turn. 
 II. 
 An employer withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan when 
the employer either permanently ceases to have an obligation to 
contribute under the plan or permanently ceases all covered 
operations under the plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1383(a).  The employer is 
liable for its share of the plan's unfunded vested benefits as 
calculated at the time of withdrawal.  29 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1383, 
1391; Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension 
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 609, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2272 (1993).  The plan 
sponsor has the responsibility of determining this withdrawal 
liability, notifying the employer and collecting payment.  29 
U.S.C. § 1382.  If the employer disputes the amount set, it may 
ask the plan sponsor to conduct a reasonable review of the 
computed liability.  29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(A).  In the event the 
dispute is unresolved, either party may request arbitration.  29 
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1).  The arbitrator's award, in turn, may be 
challenged in federal court.  29 U.S.C. § 1401(b)(2). 
 Congress enacted MPPAA out of concern that multiemployer 
pension plans would collapse as employers withdrew if the 
remaining contributors became too few in number to pay the 
unfunded vested benefits.  See H.R. Rep. No. 869, Pt. II, 96th 
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Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2918, 3000-01.  Congress foresaw that the purpose of MPPAA would 
be undermined if employers could postpone paying their debts to 
pension funds by engaging in protracted litigation over 
withdrawal liability.  Pantry Pride, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Tri-
State Pension Fund, 747 F.2d 169, 171 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing 
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, Summary and Analysis 
of S. 1076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980), reprinted in Special 
Supp. 310, Pens.Rep. (BNA) 81, 84-85 (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 869, 
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2952).  Therefore, the statute 
directs employers to begin payments upon notification of 
withdrawal liability, whether or not they choose to dispute the 
determination.   
 Section 4219(c)(2) of MPPAA states: 
Withdrawal liability shall be payable in accordance with the 
schedule set forth by the plan sponsor . . . beginning no 
later than 60 days after the date of the demand 
notwithstanding any request for review or appeal of 
determinations of the amount of such liability or of the 
schedule. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2).  Similarly, § 4221(d) of MPPAA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(d), specifies that payments are to be made during 
arbitration.  Should the arbitrator decide that the plan sponsor 
erred in assessing withdrawal liability, the employer is 
reimbursed for any overpayment.  Id. 
 When an employer fails to make a withdrawal liability 
payment within the prescribed time, an action may be brought in 
federal or state court to compel payment.  29 U.S.C. § 1451(b) & 
(c).  The plan sponsor need show only that it made a demand for 
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interim payments under 29 U.S.C. § 1382 and that the payments 
were not made. 
 Here, Beaverbrook does not dispute that withdrawal liability 
payment was demanded, or that it has refused to comply with the 
demand.  Instead, it argues that a motion for preliminary 
injunction is not a proper procedure for either compelling 
payment or determining whether the appellees are all considered 
employers for purposes of MPPAA.  We reject its argument.  The 
denomination of the procedural vehicle is not important.  It is 
true that we often consider demands for interim withdrawal 
liability payments after summary judgment.  E.g., Board of 
Trustees of Trucking Employees Pension Fund v. Centra, 983 F.2d 
495 (3d Cir. 1992); United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters 
Union Local No. 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 
F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 481 U.S. 735 (1987).  
Nonetheless, we have never foreclosed using preliminary 
injunctive relief to ensure the payments mandated by Congress are 
made.   
 For instance, in Pantry Pride, we heard an appeal from a 
district court order denying a motion to compel withdrawal 
liability payments, which we construed as an order denying a 
preliminary injunction.  747 F.2d at 170-71.  Although we held 
that the district court should not have considered the motion 
because the moving party in that action had not first made a 
claim for interim payments, we indicated that the district court 
would be free to consider a request for affirmative relief once 
the claim had been made, since the court could then be certain 
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the employer had been afforded an opportunity to respond to the 
motion and raise all defenses.  Id. at 171-72.  In this case, the 
Fund acted as we directed in Pantry Pride, first filing a 
complaint with a claim for interim payments, then making its 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
 The district court held that for the Fund to obtain 
preliminary injunctive relief it must first meet the traditional 
requirements we reiterated in Acierno v. New Castle County:  1) a 
reasonable probability of eventual success in the litigation; and 
2) irreparable injury if relief is not granted, while taking into 
account when relevant; 3) the possibility of harm to other 
interested persons from the grant or denial of the injunction 
and; 4) the public interest.  40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer 
Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 919-20 (3d Cir. 1974)).  The 
district court found that any loss to the Fund could be measured 
by economic terms; hence, the Fund would suffer no irreparable 
injury.  In so finding, the district court erred. 
 The traditional four-prong test for garden-variety 
preliminary injunctions is not applicable in this context.  In 
enacting the interim withdrawal liability provisions of MPPAA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1399(c)(2), 1401(d), and the judicial mechanism for 
their enforcement, 29 U.S.C. § 1451(b) & (c), Congress has 
effectively determined that pension funds will be irreparably 
harmed unless employers are enjoined to make interim payments 
while litigation proceeds.  By enacting the withdrawal liability 
provisions, Congress has concluded that the uninterrupted flow of 
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payments is important in itself, Pantry Pride, 747 F.2d at 171, 
and that the ultimate recovery of payments will not suffice to 
make the Fund whole.  Congress has likewise determined that 
neither party's probability of success in litigation is relevant: 
 interim payments must be made regardless. 
 Employers may be financially pressed to make sizeable 
monthly payments to pension funds, and some courts when deciding 
generally whether to order interim payment under 29 U.S.C. § 
1381, have created an equitable exception to the requirement in 
instances where the employer can show that it would suffer severe 
financial hardship, and that the pension fund's claim is 
frivolous or not colorable.  See Trustees of Plumbers and 
Pipefitters National Pension Fund v. Mar-Len, Inc., 30 F.3d 621, 
626 (5th Cir. 1994); Trustees of the Chicago Truck Drivers 
Pension Fund v. Rentar Industries, Inc., 951 F.2d 152, 155 (7th 
Cir. 1991); see also Giroux Brothers Transportation, Inc. v. New 
England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, 73 F.3d 1, 5 
(1st Cir. 1996) (dictum).  Similarly, the district court 
indicated that, when considering the merits of the Fund's claim 
for interim withdrawal liability payments, it might have the 
equitable authority to refuse to order payments if Beaverbrook 
showed that irreparable injury would result. 
 We have never held that there are any equitable exceptions 
to the statutory provisions on interim payments, see Centra, 983 
F.2d at 507-08,1 and we decline to do so now.  Congress has 
                     
     
1In Flying Tiger, 830 F.3d at 1253, we suggested in dictum 
that a court could deny a pension fund's request upon an 
employer's demonstration of irreparable injury.  However, we went 
  
 
 9 
clearly indicated its intent in this matter.  The plain language 
of the statute declares, "Withdrawal liability shall be payable 
in accordance with the schedule set forth by the plan sponsor . . 
. ."  29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2) (emphasis added).  No exceptions are 
provided.  Our jurisdiction is limited to ordering the employer 
to make interim payments once the pension fund has demonstrated 
that it complied with the statutory requirements for calculating 
liability and notifying the employer.  29 U.S.C. § 1382. 
 Notably, the two circuits which adopted an irreparable-
injury exception have later held that courts only have discretion 
to exercise it once the employer has made an affirmative showing 
that the pension fund lacks a colorable or non-frivolous claim.  
Mar-Len, 30 F.3d at 626 (5th Cir.); Rentar Industries, 951 F.2d 
at 155 (7th Cir.).  These circuits have adopted the equitable 
exception solely to ensure that the courts are not used by an 
unscrupulous pension fund lacking a legitimate withdrawal 
liability claim to squeeze money from an employer and propel it 
into bankruptcy.  Mar-Len, 30 F.3d at 626 (citing Trustees of 
Chicago Truck Drivers Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 
935 F.2d 114, 119 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 We do not now have occasion to consider adopting a similar 
equitable exception.  At no point in the argument of this case 
has Beaverbrook contended that the Fund's claim is frivolous or 
non-colorable, although supplemental briefs were submitted on the 
                                                                  
on to say that any such potential defenses were irrelevant to the 
issue in Flying Tiger, namely, whether the dispute in that case 
had to be arbitrated. 
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very issue of possible equitable defenses to interim payment 
liability.  See Rentar Industries, 951 F.2d at 155 (holding that 
the employer must make an affirmative showing that the pension 
fund lacks a colorable claim).  Nor did Beaverbrook submit any 
evidence to support its claim of irreparable harm.  See id. 
(declaring the district court was not obligated to hold a hearing 
so the employer could demonstrate irreparable harm when employer 
offered no evidence to support its assertion). 
 We agree with the reasoning employed by the Fifth and 
Seventh circuits in concluding that a showing of irreparable harm 
to the employer is alone insufficient to warrant equitable relief 
from interim payment liability.  In both instances, these courts 
of appeals have recognized that withdrawing employers are often 
financially troubled companies.  Mar-Len, 30 F.3d at 626; Central 
Transport, 935 F.2d at 118-19.  If such companies are allowed to 
defer paying their debt to the pension funds, and go out of 
business while liability is being litigated, the pension funds 
will be saddled with full liability for the unfunded pension 
benefits.  The interim payment provisions are designed to 
diminish this risk.  Mar-Len 30 F.3d at 626; Central Transport 
935 F.2d at 118. 
 We believe that it would contort the law if we were to allow 
the undercapitalized or financially precarious companies that 
pose the very risk to pension funds that MPPAA was designed to 
correct to defer payment because they pose that risk.  It is 
inappropriate to refuse a preliminary injunction ordering interim 
withdrawal liability payments on the grounds that the payments 
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might pose a financial risk to the employer. 
 Congress has effectively answered all the questions a court 
generally asks when considering a motion for a preliminary 
injunction.  We will not substitute our own views on the wisdom 
of ordering interim withdrawal liability payments.  The Fund had 
sustained its burden of showing that withdrawal liability was 
assessed, Beaverbrook was notified and payments were not made.  
That is all the statute requires.  Therefore, the district court 
erred by refusing to grant the Fund's request for a preliminary 
injunction. 
 III. 
 The district court also did not decide whether all of the 
appellees are employers for purposes of MPPAA, finding that our 
decision in Flying Tiger directed that the issue first be 
resolved in arbitration.  Here too it erred, because resolving 
this issue determines the arbitrator's authority over the 
withdrawal liability dispute. 
 In both Flying Tiger and our recent decision in Doherty v. 
Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of Philadelphia, we have 
distinguished between disputes over whether an entity has ceased 
to be an employer within the meaning of MPPAA, which must be 
resolved in arbitration, and disputes over whether an entity has 
ever become an employer, which must be resolved in the courts.  
Doherty, 16 F.3d 1386, 1390-91 (3d Cir. 1994); Flying Tiger, 830 
F.2d at 1250-51.  In the first instance, Congress has directed 
that an arbitrator shall initially determine if an entity that 
was once an employer took steps to evade or avoid liability as 
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defined under 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c).  29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) ("Any 
dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor of a 
multiemployer plan concerning a determination made under sections 
1381 through 1399 of this title shall be resolved through 
arbitration."); Flying Tiger, 830 F.2d at 1250.   
 By contrast, an entity which has never been an employer 
within the meaning of MPPAA is not subject to the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction, since 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) only mandates 
arbitration for disputes between "an employer and the plan 
sponsor."  Doherty, 16 F.3d at 1390 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 
1401(a)(1)).  Therefore, entity's employer status is a legal 
question to be resolved by the court.  In particular, we held in 
Doherty that the issue of whether persons or entities are "alter 
egos" or members of the same controlled group is properly 
resolved in the courts.  Id. at 1390-91. 
 Here, some of the appellees have disputed the Fund's 
assertion that they are liable as employers under an "alter-ego" 
or controlled-group theory.  This is a question of law upon which 
courts are indeed empowered to act.  The district court erred by 
holding that the issue should be resolved in arbitration.  We 
will remand this issue for further proceedings.   
 IV. 
 For these reasons, we will reverse and remand to the 
district court to determine whether the appellees are employers 
under MPPAA, and for it to enter an order requiring Beaverbrook 
to make interim payments as scheduled by the Fund.  
     ________________________ 
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 Circuit JudgeFRANK J. GALGAY; FRANCIS P. BONNER, TRUSTEES OF THE 
ANTHRACITE HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND (PENSION TRUST); ANTHRACITE 
HEALTH AND WELFARE FUND (PENSION TRUST), Appellants v. 
BEAVERBROOK COAL COMPANY; GEORGE HUSS JR.; WILLIAM HUSS; HUSS 
INDUSTRIES, INC. 
Appellees, No. 95-7532 
 
BECKER, J., Dissenting. 
 The majority's decision is driven by its conclusion that 
when the Congress provided that withdrawal liability "shall be 
payable . . . no later than 60 days after the date of the demand 
notwithstanding any request for review," 29 U.S.C. § 1399(c)(2) 
(emphasis added), Congress provided for a mandatory injunction.  
Under this approach, a district court must impose such an 
injunction even if:  (1) the trustees' demand for payment is 
frivolous (in terms of either liability or amount demanded); and 
(2) the payment would bankrupt or financially cripple the 
withdrawing employer and eliminate the possibility of future 
payments.  I disagree.   
 I. 
 First, I doubt that Congress's words here are susceptible to 
that construction.  It uses the phrase "shall be payable," which 
seems much more open-ended than "shall be paid."  Thus, the 
statute is at least ambiguous.  Looking to Congressional intent, 
I do not believe that Congress here intended a result so 
inflexible and therefore so problematic.   
 Like the majority, I read Congress to be concerned that an 
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employer could stymie a pension fund's collection attempts by 
pursuing litigation over withdrawal liability.  However, by 
disallowing consideration of the employer's inability to pay in 
the face of a frivolous withdrawal liability claim, the majority 
actually undermines Congress's goals.  If an employer becomes 
financially insolvent as a result of its withdrawal payment 
obligations, the pension fund will not only be unable to receive 
"an uninterrupted flow of payments,"  but also will be the but 
for cause of its own inability to secure "ultimate recovery."  
Furthermore, the proposal that I will advance -- giving courts 
the discretion to deny a preliminary injunction only when the 
pension's claim is not colorable and when requiring interim 
payments would push a financially distressed employer over the 
cliffs -- preserves Congress's "pay now, dispute later" scheme.   
 II. 
 There is an even more fundamental problem with the 
majority's analysis, one which does not depend on finding an 
ambiguity in the Congressional language.  The majority 
uncritically assumes that the Congressional locution "shall be 
payable" translates into a proscription against a federal court's 
using its historic equity powers to withhold or condition relief. 
 It is incorrect. 
 A. 
   As I see it, the seminal cases in this area are Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944), and Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 
328 U.S. 395 (1946).  These cases arose under the World War II 
Emergency Price Control Act and Regulations, and involved actions 
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by the Price Administrator to enforce compliance therewith.  
Section 205(a) of the Act provided that  
[w]henever in the judgment of the Administrator any person has 
engaged or is about to engage in any acts or practices which 
constitute or will constitute a violation of any provision 
of section 4 of this Act, *** he may make application to the 
appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or 
practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with such 
provisions, and upon a showing by the Administrator that 
such person has engaged or is about to engage in any such 
acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, 
restraining order, or other order shall be granted without 
bond.  
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 50 U.S.C. App. Supp. II 
§§ 901 et seq., 925.  (emphasis added). 
 The question presented in Hecht was whether the 
Administrator, having established that a defendant has engaged in 
acts or practices violative of § 4 of the Act, is entitled as of 
right to an injunction restraining the defendant from engaging in 
such acts or practices, or whether the court has some discretion 
to grant or withhold such relief.  Although the Court determined 
that the mandatory character of § 205(a) is clear from its 
language, history and purpose (in our case the language is less 
clear), it held that the phrase "shall be granted" does not 
require issuance of an injunction against violation of a price 
regulation merely because the Administrator asks for it.  
Instead, the district court may, in accordance with equity 
practice, exercise discretion in determining what order shall be 
made.  Hecht, 321 U.S. at 328-29.  The court explained that  
[a] grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance orders hardly 
suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all 
circumstances.  We cannot but think that if Congress had 
intended to make such a drastic departure from the 
traditions of equity practice, an unequivocal statement of 
its purpose would have been made. 
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Id. at 329. 
 In Porter, the Court dealt with the power of a federal 
court, in an enforcement proceeding under § 205(a), to order 
restitution of rents collected by a landlord in excess of the 
permissible maximums.  In rejecting the position of the Price 
Administrator that there was no jurisdiction under the statute to 
give the equitable remedy of restitution, the Court, following 
Hecht, held that 
 the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to 
be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid 
legislative command.  Unless a statute in so many words, or 
by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the 
court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that 
jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.  'The great 
principles of equity, securing complete justice, should not 
be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful construction.'  
Brown v. Swann, 10 Pet. 497, 503.  See also Hecht Co. v. 
Bowles, supra.  
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.   
 Another helpful case is Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 
U.S. 305 (1982).  In Weinberger, the Court faced the question 
whether the mandatory language of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act requires a district court to enjoin immediately all 
discharges of pollutants that do not comply with the Act's permit 
requirements, or whether the district court retains discretion to 
order other relief to achieve compliance.  Reviewing the 
structure of the statutory scheme and the legislative history, 
the Court held that the statute contemplated the exercise of 
discretion.  Importantly, however, the Court also relied on Hecht 
Co. v. Bowles, supra, pointing out that, while Congress may 
intervene and guide or control the exercise of the courts' 
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historic equity discretion, which reflects a "practice with a 
background of several hundred years of history," Hecht, 321 U.S. 
at 329, we "should not lightly assume that Congress has intended 
to depart from established principles."  Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 
313 (emphasis added).  Nor should we. 
 B. 
 Nothing cited to us suggests that Congress has been so 
direct and explicit in the MPPAA that we can conclude, much less 
“lightly assume,” that all equitable discretion has been removed. 
 I, therefore, would follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit in 
Trustees of Plumbers and Pipefitters N.H. Pension Fund v. Mar-
Len, Inc., 30 F.3d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 1994), and the Seventh 
Circuit in Robbins v. McNicholas Transport Co., 819 F.2d 682, 
685-86 (7th Cir. 1987).  As the majority acknowledges, these 
courts have adopted an “equitable exception” to the MPPAA’s “pay 
now, dispute later” scheme.  The equitable exception was first 
articulated by the Seventh Circuit, which observed in McNicholas: 
where the trustees bring an action to compel payments, pending 
arbitration, the court should consider the probability of 
the employer's success in defeating liability before the 
arbitrator and the impact of the demanded interim payments 
on the employer and his business. 
McNicholas Transport Co., 819 F.2d at 685.  The McNicholas 
standard has evolved into a test whereby “a reviewing court 
merely determines whether the pension plan’s claim [for 
withdrawal liability] is nonfrivolous and colorable.”  If the 
claim is colorable, then the employer “must make interim payments 
while it contests the underlying liability.”  Mar-Len, 30 F.3d at 
626.  If the claim is frivolous or not colorable, the district 
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court has a narrow measure of discretion to excuse interim 
payments which to do otherwise would cause irreparable economic 
injury to the employer.  Id.; Trustees of Chicago Truck Drivers 
Union Pension Fund v. Central Transport, Inc. 935 F.2d 114, 119 
(7th Cir. 1991).  
 In suggesting that we follow the Fifth and Seventh Circuit 
test, I underscore that the "equitable exception" would take hold 
only in the rare case.  The district court can exercise 
discretion solely to ensure that the courts are not used by an 
unscrupulous pension fund lacking a legitimate withdrawal 
liability claim to squeeze money from an employer and propel it 
into bankruptcy.  See Central Transport, 935 F.2d at 119.  It 
also bears emphasizing that federal judicial involvement need not 
be extensive nor burdensome -- federal judges are comfortable 
with making threshold colorability assessments, which is what I 
would require as to the viability of the withdrawal liability 
claim.  The same is true for the inquiry as to whether the 
withdrawal liability will be so burdensome as to permanently 
cripple the employer (and deprive the Fund of future payouts).  I 
also stress that, contrary to the majority's intimation, our 
decision in Board of Trustees of Trucking Employees Pension Fund 
v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495 (3rd Cir. 1992), did not decide the 
question before us here.  Indeed, after noting the Seventh 
Circuit position, the Centra panel was careful to explain that 
the equitable exception could not possibly apply in the case 
before it because the withdrawing employer was "well heeled." 
 C. 
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 It is not clear from the present record whether the 
Trustees' withdrawal liability claim here is in fact colorable or 
whether the financial impact of withdrawal liability payouts on 
Beaverbrook will in fact be devastating.  I note that Beaverbrook 
has represented that it will experience serious financial 
difficulty if required to make interim withdrawal payments prior 
to the resolution of its challenge to the assessment of 
liability.  And while it did not make a formal proffer on the 
point, Beaverbrook’s litigation position suggests its belief that 
the withdrawal liability claim is wholly without merit.  I would 
remand for consideration of such matters under the Seventh 
Circuit test, which I read to be conjunctive:  if the district 
court finds that the claim for withdrawal liability is not 
colorable, and if payment of withdrawal liability would push 
Beaverbrook over the cliff, as it were, it can utilize its 
equitable discretion to fashion a decree that might relieve 
Beaverbrook of the obligation to make interim payments (or some 
portion thereof).   
 A good argument can be made that this test should be made in 
the disjunctive, so as to protect every employer from frivolous 
claims and from bankruptcy.  But I would be reluctant to extend 
our equitable discretion in the absence of more persuasive 
authority and a more compelling factual scenario. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
